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CASES TO WATCH
AND MISSOURI LEGISLATIVE
SUMMARIES
United States v. Vertac, 46 F.3d 803 (8th
Cir. 1995),petitionforcert.filed, 63 U.S.L.W.
3707 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1995)(No. 94-1557)
Hercules, Incorporated and others (Hercules) appealed from a denial of their motion
for summary judgment in a cost recovery
action brought by the United States government for costs associated with the cleanup of
dioxin from the production of Agent Orange
by Hercules under contract for the United
States. Hercules supplied Agent Orange to
the United States Department of Defense
during the Vietnam War pursuant to the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA)
which provides for "rated contracts" that
take priority over other government contracts if necessary to promote the national
defense. Although these rated contracts
contained standardized government terms
and conditions, Hercules was allowed limited negotiation and modification of the
contract terms. In addition, pursuant to the
Walsh-Healey Act, the Department of Labor
had the authority to enforce health and
safety standards at Hercules' facility. The
production of Agent Orange resulted in
waste containing dioxin, the disposal of
which was not addressed in the rated contracts. As such, Hercules buried the waste
on-site without participation by the United
States government.
Affirming the district court, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held first that the
United States was not an "operator" or
"arranger" such that it would be liable for the
clean up costs of the dioxin contamination
pursuant to §107(a) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA). Noting that
operator liability may arise from "actual or
substantial control exercised by one entity
over the activities of another," the court
found that the United States did not exert
sufficient control over Hercules for it to be
liable as an operator. In addition, the court
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held that the United States was not liable as
an arranger in that the United States never
owned or possessed the hazardous waste
containing dioxin even though it had statutory and regulatory authority to control activities which include the production, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste. Further, the United States was not an arranger
despite the existence of its contractual relationship with Hercules. Alternatively, the
court found that the United States could not
be considered an arranger in that it never
supplied Hercules with the raw materials or
work in process which ultimately generated
the hazardous waste.
In addition, Hercules argued that it was
immune from liability pursuant to § 707 of
the DPA which holds harmless from liability
for damages those acting in compliance with
the DPA. However, the court concluded
that Hercules could not claim immunity
since doing so would exceed the risk imposed by §101(a) of the DPA which authorizes the prioritization of certain government
contracts when necessary to promote national defense, a result contrary to prior
caselaw interpreting the scope of the § 707
immunity.
The issues presented on appeal include:
(1)may the United States require Hercules to
bear clean up costs by itself after invoking
the authority of the DPA to appropriate all of
Hercules' production capacity to the production of Agent Orange for the United
States during the Vietnam War; (2) whether
the United States may avoid all clean up
costs even though it had the authority to
dictate the disposal of the hazardous waste
and further by contract required Hercules to
take measures to control the release of the
hazardous waste, but not argues that Hercules' actions were inadequate; (3) whether
the United States is liable as an "arranger"
pursuant to CERCLA; (4)whether the United
States is liable as an "operator" pursuant to
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CERCLA; (5) whether Hercules is immune
from liability for damages under § 707 of the
DPA; and (6) whether the United States
should be required to indemnify Hercules for
liability. Petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court was filed on March
21, 1995.
Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir.
1994), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W.
3692 (U.S. Mar. 6, 1995)(No. 94-1482)
Plaintiffs asserting mining claims in areas
within federal national forests challenged the
Department of Agriculture's regulation
through the Forest Service of transportation
means to access these mining claims. Two
of the plaintiffs held mining claims on land
designated as "wilderness areas," while the
third plaintiff's claims was located on nonwilderness land. The first Forest Service
ruling refused to allow motorized access to
pending mining claims before the validity of
the claim is established. Next, the Forest
Service disallowed motorized access even
for valid mining claims located within federal
lands when non-motorized access is adequate to carry out the mining operation.
Finally, plaintiffs challenged a Forest Service
ruling which required plaintiffs to file a plan
of proposed mining operations.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling which held
that the Forest Service has the authority to
regulate the mode of transportation a holder
of a mining claim utilizes to gain access to
that claim when that area is surrounded by
federal national forests. On appeal plaintiffs
argued that since issues of access materially
affect the validity of their mining claims,
adjudication of these issues is solely within
the jurisdiction of the Department of the
Interior which normally determines the validity of mining claims. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the two mining claims
located in wilderness areas are subject to the
reasonable regulation of the Department of
Agriculture and the Forest Service pursuant
to 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b) relating to the ingress
and egress of the mining areas. Similarly,
the court held non-wildemess areas are
subject to regulation by the Department of
Agriculture under the Organic Administration Act of 1897 to protect national forests
lands from destruction and depreciation. 16
U.S.C. §§ 478, 551.
The court next held that the plaintiff's
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in their objections to the
Forest Service regulations. Plaintiffs argued

that they fell within the "futility exception" to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies
requirement since the Forest Service's position regarding relating to the means of
transportation used was not "set" such that
resorting to agency action would be futile.
Among other issues, the court additionally denied the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment
Takings claim which argued that the Forest
Service regulations denying motorized access to the mining claims constituted a
taking of private property without just compensation. As the plaintiffs only sued for
injunctive and declaratory relief and not for
money damages, the only court that could
hear the takings claim would be the Court of
Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. Finally,
the court held that the plaintiffs' right to
procedural due process were not violated in
light of the Forest Service's detailed administrative procedures even though evidentiary
hearings were not held.
The questions presented on appeal include: (1) whether holders of mining claims
possess a Fifth Amendment property right
to gain access to their claims when they are
surrounded by federal national forest lands;
and (2) whether the Forest Service is authorized to disallow motorized access to mining
claims surrounded by federal national forest
lands without affording the holders of the
mining claims the right to an evidentiary
hearing to ensure that statutes governing
access are fairly and accurately applied.
Petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was filed on March 6, 1995.
United States v. B & W Investment Properties, 38 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1994), petition
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3660 (U.S. Feb.
27, 1995)(No. 94-1431)
The Clean Air Act (CAA) and National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) set forth regulations for
the treatment of asbestos, a hazardous air
pollutant. NESHAP also requires written
notification to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) from "any person who owns,
leases, operates, controls or supervises" a
property about to be renovated before the
renovation so the EPA may take measures
to prevent asbestos from entering the air. 40
C.F.R. § 61.141 (1989). The CAA imposes
strict liability on violators of its terms.
Defendants Wolf and B & W Investments
Properties (B & W) leased property which
included old buildings that contained asbes-

tos. B & W agreed with the lessor of the
property to buy the property pending the
removal of the asbestos. The lessor hired a
contractor to remove the asbestos, but the
lessor did not notify the EPA nor did it
comply with the safety regulations of
NESHAP. Specifically, the asbestos removal was performed in such a way that
friable asbestos could enter the air. The EPA
learned of the asbestos removal site and
halted all removal pending an investigation.
After the asbestos was removed the EPA
filed this civil suit alleging the defendants
began asbestos removal without proper
notification to the EPA, and that they violated NESHAP by failing to comply with the
procedures of asbestos removal set forth in
the CAA.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court decision finding
that the defendants were in violation of CAA
and NESHAP. Relying on §113(b)(2) of the
CAA, defendants argued that the CAA requires the EPA to give notice to a violator
before filing suit which the defendants never
received. However, the EPA argued and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the EPA did not rely on this provision of the
Act for enforcement. The EPA and the court
distinguish between hazardous air pollutants
which have "no ambient air quality standards" and air pollutants which do have
"ambient air quality standards". The court
found that §1 13(b)(2) only requires the EPA
to give notice to those violators who are in
violation of state implementation plans for
"ambient air quality standards". The court
reasoned that defendants were not in violation of state implementation plans for "ambient air quality standards" since asbestos
can have no ambient air quality standards.
Therefore, because asbestos cannot be part
of state implementation plans, the requirement of notice and procedure of the EPA are
not be govemed §113(b)(2) but by a different
section of the CAA. The court found that
§112 of the CAA, which regulates work
practice standards involving hazardous air
pollutants with no ambient air quality standard such as asbestos, was controlling in this
case. Further, §113(b)(3) of the CAA gives
the EPA authority to issue compliance orders or commence civil actions "whenever"
the EPA finds a violation of §112 of the Act.
Therefore, the court found that the EPA was

not required to give notice before commencing suit upon violators of work practice
standards involving hazardous air pollutants
with no ambient air quality standard.
Defendants further argued that they were
not liable for the violations because they
were not the owners of the property.
NESHAP extends strict liability to those who
lease, operate, control, and supervise the
property. The court found the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in holding that the
defendants were within the scope of the
"owner and operation" requirement.
The issues presented by B & W on appeal
are: (1) where asbestos is the pollutant
whether the EPA must give notice to violators pursuant to §113(a)(1) prior to filing suit
when the state implementation plan encompasses the pollutant; and (2) whether the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was authorized to directly address this question. Petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was filed on February 27,
1995.

Missouri House Bill 251
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK
REMEDIAL FUND
During the last days of the 1995 session,
the Missouri General Assembly passed and
the Governor is expected to sign House Bill
251. House Bill 251 amends the underground storage tank law codified atMo. REv.
STAT. §§ 319.100-.139 (1994). In 1989,
H.B. 77 created the "underground storage
tank insurance fund." Prior applicants seeking to be accepted into the insurance fund
only received coverage for cleanup of contamination caused by releases which occurred after acceptance into the fund. However, H.B. 251 now allows all owners and
operators of underground storage tanks to
participate in the fund regardless of when
the release occurred. Newly enacted §
319.131.8 provides that "[t]he fund shall
provide moneys for cleanup of contamination caused by releases from underground
storage tanks, the owner or operator of
which is participating in the underground
storage tank insurance fund or the owner or
operator of which has made application for
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participation in the fund by August 28,
1995, regardless of when such release occurred, provided that those persons who
have made application are ultimately accepted into the fund. Applicants shall not be
eligible for fund benefits until they are accepted into the fund." (Emphasis added).
With regard to underground storage tanks
which have been taken out of use prior to
August 28, 1995, the fund will provide
cleanup moneys ifthe contaminated site has
"been documented by or reported to the
department of natural resources prior to
August 28, 1995 ... ." Mo. REV. STAT. §
319.131.9. However, "the fund shall make
no reimbursements for expenses incurred
prior to August 28, 1995." Id.
Assuming that the Governor signs H.B.
251, owners and operators of USTs will
have less than three months to file an
application with the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources (MDNR) for participation
in the fund. Practitioners should also note
that USTs taken out of use prior to August
28, 1995 must be documented by or reported to MDNR prior to August 28, 1995.
House Bill 251 now requires MDNR to
use risk-based cleanup standards. Mo. REv.
STAT. § 319.109 (1994) was amended to
require the MDNR to use "risk based corrective standards which take into account the
level of risk to public health and the environment associated with site specific conditions
and future land usage." This amendment
may provide fertile ground for argument
over appropriate cleanup standards.
- by Robert J. Brundage, Esq.

Missouri House Bill 414
"BROWNFIELDS"
On May 12, the Missouri Legislature
passed the third "Brownfields" law in the
country. I wrote the law for the St. Louis
Regional Commerce and Growth Association and the law was supported by RCGA,
the Missouri Chamber of Commerce, Associated Industries of Missouri and other businesses and business groups. The law balances economic development interests with
environmental safety. A "brownfield" is an
abandoned commercial or industrial property which, although generally marketable,
cannot be sold because of actual or per-
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ceived contamination problems. These abandoned properties end up being owned by
governments, such as the City of St. Louis or
St. Louis County. Inventories of such abandoned properties, and the associated costs
of maintenance of these properties, have
continued to grow and drain government
revenues. Currently, there are millions of
square feet of otherwise valuable commercial properties owned by our local govemments because no potential buyer wants to
become liable for the past contamination
which may exist at these sites.
Nearly a year ago, the RCGA formed its
Brownfields Task Force. Composed of representatives from the St. Louis Development Corporation, the St. Louis County
Economic Council, and environmental professionals from the fields of engineering,
environmental consulting, law, banking, and
insurance, the Task Force devised a plan to
move the millions of square feet of abandoned properties into active uses which
create jobs in the St. Louis Metropolitan
Area. One piece of the plan resulted in the
writing and passage of the "Brownfields"
law section of House Bill 414.
The Brownfields law addresses selling
abandoned properties owned by govemmental units for new use. Itcreates incentive
programs for funding assistance, tax credits
and abatements, and additional liability releases and immunities. The Brownfields bill
will encourage businesses to expand or
relocate into existing industrial and commercial facilities rather than buying new properties and building new facilities in "greenfields".
The funding assistance and tax credit
programs are controlled by the Missouri
Department of Economic Development. One
key condition of both forms of assistance is
that once built or rehabbed, the facility
operation must either retain at least 10 full
time jobs in the State or create at least 25
new full time jobs. This reinforces the focus
of the bill on economic development. More
weight is given in awarding tax credits to
creating jobs in economically depressed
neighborhoods, such as those beset by employer closings and high unemployment.
The Brownfields law authorizes the creation of a $10 million Property Reuse Fund
within the State treasury. The money can be
used for direct loans and loan guarantees to
prospective purchasers, and grants to govemmental units. Except for environmental
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remediation costs, the projects must be
commercially viable. No project loan, loan
guarantee or grant can exceed $1 million
dollars. Private lenders who make loans
under the guarantee program receive immunity from the associated environmental conditions of the property.
Prospective purchasers, under specified
conditions - especially job creation and
retention - may receive tax credits and
abatements ordinarily available under the
enterprise and satellite zone laws. But, these
Brownfield facilities will not be either an
enterprise zone or a satellite zone. These
credits and abatements include ad valorem
tax credits, income tax refunds and exemptions, and worker training credits.
The single most important tax credit in
the Brownfields law is the new remediation
credit available to the purchaser for the costs
of voluntarily cleaning up the contamination
at the abandoned property. This includes
the costs of equipment and installation, and
the ongoing operation and maintenance
costs associated with long term remediation
projects such as groundwater treatment.
This means that for creating jobs and rehabilitating older industrial facilities, the purchaser can, in effect, obtain a no cost or low
cost clean up of the property and be protected from the liabilities associated with the
property's past use.
This benefits the general public, the govemment and the purchaser. The Purchaser
creates and retains jobs, elevating the abandoned properties from governmental cost
burdens to revenue producers. The
remediation and other credits incubate these
relocated businesses to protect their future
viability, the stability of the jobs they directly
create, and the additional jobs they may
spawn in the neighborhood to support the
new operation. The government and the
public also obtain a clean up of the property
contamination financed by private money.
The remediation tax credit is a reimbursement because the purchaser had no part in
creating the contamination problems but is
voluntarily cleaning them up.
The final major aspect of the Brownfields
Law, alluded to previously, is the release of
liability which the prospective purchaser
receives in exchange for cleaning the property to levels that are safe for its intended use.
Under current environmental laws the current owner or operator of a contaminated
property can be held liable for the entire

clean-up even though they may have had
nothing to do with creating the problem.
The Brownfield clean-ups will be governed
by the existing Missouri Voluntary Clean-Up
Program and supervised by the Department
of Natural Resources. If an environmental
investigation shows that property conditions
do not warrant remediation activity for the
property to be safe for the intended industrial
or commercial use, then the Department of
Natural Resources will issue a letter indicating that no further action is required at that
time. This reserves the possibility that if new
conditions are discovered or if the use
changes, such as from a warehouse to
apartments, additional investigation and
remediation may be required.
If a purchaser significantly cleans up the
contaminants found so as to improve the
condition of the property and make it safe
for its intended industrial or commercial use,
then the purchaser will also receive a "no
further action" letter from the Missouri DNR.
A clean-up to industrial or commercial use
standards contemplates that in some cases
these clean-ups may not lower the contamination to the absolute safe levels generally
reflected in regulatory standards and intended for application in residential areas.
Institutional controls, such as restrictive covenants being placed in a property deed or
lease, can also be used to enforce adherence
to the intended commercial use. Again, if
conditions or uses change, additional actions may be required.
Finally, a purchaser may receive a covenant not to sue for the clean-up performed
by or on behalf of a purchaser which lowers
the contamination levels to safe residential
standards. This covenant is an agreement by
the State that they will not try to enforce or
sue for additional remediation actions. Residential standards are generally reflected in
regulations of environmental regulatory agencies. This form of release is unique to the
Brownfields program and is not ordinarily
offered through Missouri's Voluntary CleanUp program. Obtaining a covenant not to
sue requires public comment on the proposed clean-up plan, including a public hearing held in the affected area of the property.
Once the Missouri DNR has issued written
approval of the completed clean-up, the
purchaser is immune from liability to third
parties for the preexisting environmental
conditions to the extent of the clean-up
performed.

While there are other aspects to the
Brownfields law, these are the major components that will make abandoned properties
attractive to prospective businesses for relocation and expansion opportunities. It reopens a new segment of millions of square
feet of otherwise commercially valuable properties that were ignored because of the strict
environmental liabilities associated with
mere current ownership or operation of
contaminated properties. The Missouri
Legislature has taken a bold step to revitalize
the region.
-by Sheldon D. Korlin

Missouri Senate Bill 407
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL;
OIL SPILLS
Senate Bill 407 (SB 407), amending Chapter 260 of the Missouri Revised Statutes by
adding new sections relating to hazardous
waste and oil spills, was signed into law on
May 18, 1995. The first new section created
by SB 407, § 260.482, provides that in first
class counties with a population of less than
300,000, incineration or disposal by the
United States Department of Defense of any
hazardous waste resulting from activities
associated with the cleanup of a facility not
involved in the production of weapons shall
be conducted only at the site where such
waste was produced. In addition, § 260.482
states that no such incineration shall take
place after five years following the completion of the test bum of such incineration.
Section 260.819, which relates to oil spill
responses, exempts certain persons from
liability for removal costs or damages resulting from actions taken or omitted that are
consistent with the National Contingency
Plan or directive from a party with responsibility for the oil spill response. However, this
exemption does not apply to any responsible party, for damages that include personal injury or wrongful death, or to any
person who is negligent or engages in willful
misconduct. Ifa person is relieved of liability
for removal costs or damages pursuant to
this section, those costs shall be borne by a
responsible party. Finally, § 260.818 provides for nine definitions for terms used in §
260.819.

BILLS ADOPTED, PENDING
GOVERNOR'S SIGNATURE

Missouri House Bill 81
BATTERY SALES
House Bill 81 (HB 81), relating to the sale
of batteries, has been passed by both the
House and Senate and is awaiting the
Govemor's signature. HB 81 first provides
for definitional distinctions between alkaline,
lead, and mercury batteries, whereas existing law applies to batteries in general. Further, HB 81 prohibits the sale of button cell
mercury batteries after January 1, 1996, and
no mercury batteries may be sold after
January 1, 1998. In addition, alkaline batteries manufactured after January 1, 1997
are prohibited from sale if the mercury
content is intentionally introduced into the
battery, or ifthe mercury content exceeds 25
milligrams in button cell alkaline batteries.
Finally, HB 81 provides that a violation of
these sale provisions is punishable as a Class
C misdemeanor.

Missouri Senate Bill
60 & 112
WASTE TIRES; OIL RECYCLING
Senate Bill 60 & 112 (SB 60 & 112),
dealing with the disposal of waste tires and
recycling of used motor oil, has been passed
by both House and Senate and is now
eligible for the Govemor's desk. Along with
providing for new definitions relating to the
waste tire disposal statutes, this bill establishes a tire trade-in program and a record
keeping system for tire retailers and waste
tire haulers. In addition, the measure provides for the storage of waste tires at solid
waste facilities upon compliance with certain requirements, along with penalties for
waste tire violators. SB 60 & 112 also
extends the Waste Tire Fund new tire fee
and removes most exemptions to the new
tire fee. Finally, SB 60 & 112 establishes a
recycling program for used motor oil.
- by Alyse Hakami

- by Alyse Hakami
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